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Rumors surrounding the Hebraic-American classical philosopher Leo Strauss’ supposed influence on
leading neoconservative politicians and commentators make reconsidering Leo Strauss’ thought and legacy
a philosophical task of the first political importance today. A host of articles have appeared by students
and (more recently) books by Stephen Smith (2006), Heinrich Meier (2006) and Catherine and Michael
Zuckert (2006). This essay is proffered as a critical contribution, by a non-Straussian student, to this liter-
ature. Its methodology and justification is to return to and reconsider Strauss’ earliest works, on the
‘political theology’ of Benedict de Spinoza. The paper argues two theses. The first is that the popular de-
piction of Strauss as an esoteric Nietzschean hiding behind a ‘noble’ classical or theological veneer import-
antly misses the mark. The second is that Strauss’ early work shows his proximity, via Jacobi, to the
Heideggerian disclosure of the groundless grounds of philosophical reason, given which one must extra-
rationally choose reason over faith. One striking implication of this argument, in the contemporary political
climate, is to underscore the unlikely convergence between the philosophical sources of neoconservative
and the ‘post-structuralist’ thought associated with much of the intellectual left in France and the Anglo-
phone world. Yet in contrast to the widespread image of Strauss, I argue that the mature Strauss’ continuing
commitment to this decisionistic framework is in fact most clear is his ‘exoteric,’ public statements on re-
ligion – i.e. it is not the ‘esoteric’ purloined letter Strauss’ critics seek out. The reason for Strauss’ continuing
public advocacy of the impossibility of reason’s disproving faith, I propose, highlights the primarily political
(versus philosophical) nature of this turn: in Strauss’ conservative acceptance of the political necessity of
religion for social order, framed in terms of a revised commitment to the ‘medieval’ (versus modern) en-
lightenment of Maimonides and Farabi.
APOLOGY / FRAME
Leo Strauss’ first book was Spinoza’s Critique of Religion. Written between 1925 and 1928 and
published in 1930, it belongs to the period of what one critic has called ‘Strauss before Straussi-
anism’ (Gunnell 1994). Yet its importance for Strauss’ entire oeuvre, and thus the career-long
importance of his encounter with Spinoza, is underscored by Strauss’ re-presentation of the work
in the 1962 anglophone edition. Strauss ‘book-ends’ the 1962 edition with an autobiographical
‘Preface’ which is as close to an ‘Apology of Strauss’ as Strauss ever came (and which is celebrated
as such by students or acolytes) (eg Meier 2006: 1–17; Smith 2006: 75–77). Strauss (1962) adds
as an Appendix what the ‘Preface’ announces to be the first manifestation of his ‘changed orient-
ation’, his 1932 ‘Comments’ on the German authoritarian theorist Carl Schmitt’s Der Begriff
des Politischen (Strauss 1962: 31). The 1962 ‘Preface’ to Spinoza’s Critique of Religion opens,
finally, by stating that his 1930 book had been written by a young man in the grips of the
‘theologico-political predicament’ (Strauss 1962: 1). This nominally Spinozian problematic,
Strauss confesses, has remained at the heart of all his later or ‘mature’ writings, however far he
had otherwise wandered from this early text.
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Nevertheless, to consider Strauss’ Spinozabuch in the contemporary conjuncture, as I propose
to do here, is a fraught thing, for reasons that need to be mentioned at the start. The first reason
is that Strauss’ book on Spinoza, much more directly than many of his later texts, reflects Strauss’
abiding self-positioning as both a philosopher and an ‘Hebraic sage’, to invoke Harold Bloom’s
telling description (Smith 1994: 81). Spinoza’s Critique of Religion is the work of a young author
who writes, avowedly, from within the particular tradition of his birth (Strauss 1924), as well
as a philosopher. It is written at the time that the young Strauss’ was passionately engaged in
debates concerning the fate of his people, coming to political self-consciousness through and
against the Zionism of Pinsker and others (Zank 2002: 3–33). Now: if you ‘google’ or ‘nexis’
Strauss and/or ‘neo-conservatism’, you will find that conspiracy theories á la Lindon La Rouche
about the latter as a Zionist conspiracy are generally about two mouse clicks away. Especially
since anti-semitism is one charge that some of Strauss’ neoconservative defenders have not failed
to level against critics (eg Muravchik 2004: 2491), the author has no more desire than anyone
else to enter into these troubled waters. More gravely than this, defenders of Strauss against
Drury and others’ charges of concealed Machiavellianism (Drury 1988) often point towards
Strauss’ grounding in the pre- or post-modern tradition of ‘political theology’. As Taubes has
argued, and as we will see, the founding supposition of this ‘tradition’ is the non-autarky of human
reason, or the inability of humans alone to found lasting political institutions and community
(cf. Hartwich et al. 2004: 140). The author not only has profound hesitations about the political
legacy, suppositions, and possibilities of ‘political theology’ as a possibility, by whomever it is
espoused. I also am not convinced that recourse to it ultimately deflects the charges of Machiavel-
lianism against Strauss, however much an unbeliever the Florentine secretary allegedly was
(Strauss 1958: 31–32, 51–52, 185–191). The idea of rendering theology a political thing, on the
contrary, would seem to represent its ultramodern instrumentalization, as political theology’s
founder, Carl Schmitt’s, defining relation with Hobbes would indicate (Schmitt 1996a; 1996b).
Secondly: to write on Strauss in 2006, even in Australia, is not a particularly rewarding ven-
ture2, and certainly not one conducive to the philosophical acquiescientia Spinoza for one valorises
for theorists or philosophers, in allegiance with the classical heritage. If one writes critically on
Strauss, one risks exposing oneself to tirades from acolytes accusing one of ‘seeking the limelight,
not the light’, belonging to the ‘chattering classes’, and – by implication – much worse than any
of that (Clarke 2004). On the other side, to write on Strauss at all, even critically, seems inevitably
to encourage suspicions among academic contemporaries that one is a ‘Straussian’, although
even Strauss’ avowed followers do not agree on what this finally means.
However empty the latter types of charges are, I want to frame my reading of ‘young Strauss’
here around them. Because it seems to me that they do reflect at least three things that are im-
portant in assessing Strauss’ work in today’s political conjuncture. Firstly – and I will be trying
to substantiate this as we proceed below3 – the political suspicion of Strauss’ work which they
bespeak is defensible and salutary in a modern liberal nation-state such as the Australia of the
early twenty first century. Secondly, the supposition on which these accusations of ‘Straussianism‘
are based – namely, that to know someone’s thought is to believe as a disciple might in the revealed
word of one’s master – is exactly what should be at stake in reading Strauss’ Spinoza’s Critique
of Religion, or any of his other works. Thirdly, if one thing Strauss’ work throughout his career
highlights is that philosophy has always operated by suspending or contravening widely-accepted
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doxai (opinions), one thing that strikes a contemporary reader of Strauss – despite signature
neoconservative attacks on ‘relativism’, ‘historicism’, or ‘postmodernism’ in the academic ‘new
class’ – is how closely many of his ideas mirror many of the widely-accepted ideas of the ‘post-
post-structuralist’ left. In particular, although Strauss’ analyses are framed very differently, Strauss
agrees with the post-structuralists (for example, Lyotard or Derrida) that modernist political
rationalism is largely an ill-conceived, if not dangerous, venture whose most horrific manifestation
was the Shoah. Following 1928, around the time Strauss completed Spinoza’s Critique of Reason,
furthermore, Strauss – no less than the French post-structuralists – radically turned his back on
the possibility of any form of modern, dialectical or other ‘internalizations’ of the distinctions
between the competing sources of the modern age (Strauss 1935: 3–19), which like Shestov
Strauss names ‘Athens and Jerusalem’. As Strauss’ important criticisms of Kojeve would attest
– the very same teacher of modernity and the ‘end of history’ against whose heterodox Hegelianism
Foucault, Derrida, Lyotard and others also largely set their backs – Strauss’ critique of the
modern ‘universal and homogenous state’ is conceptually and genealogically an uncannily close
theoretical cousin of the new left he and his followers abhor (Strauss [and Kojeve] 2000: 177–314).
As a Jewish thinker, Strauss came from around 1930 to reject either liberal assimilation for
his people (the position of someone like Freud (Strauss 1928/2002)), or merely political Zionism
– however ‘honorable’ (Strauss 1935: 19). The latter Strauss now argued was another form of
modernist assimilation, as if a restored Jewish homeland could become a secular nation like any
other (Smith 2006: 78–79). As a philosopher, Strauss now argued that what he calls ‘orthodoxy’,
whether Jewish or Christian (see anon), stands in what we might term after Lyotard an irresolvable
‘differend’ vis-a-vis reason or philosophy (Lyotard 1988). The claims of revelation as such, and
of the Jewish people in particular, Strauss instead comes to argue, stand as emblematic of the
most fundamental philosophical problem of all – that of the relation between the particular and
the universal, the one and the many, or ‘the absence of redemption’ as such (Smith 2006: 65).
The ‘tension’ between reason and revelation, Strauss comes to argue until his very last texts, is
at the root of the peculiar ‘vitality’ of the West (Strauss 1989: 289, 295). More than this, ethically
or existentially:
No one can be both a philosopher and a theologian or, for that matter, a third
which is beyond the conflict between philosophy and theology, or a synthesis
of both. But every one of us can and ought to be either the one or the other,
the philosopher open to the challenge of theology or the theologian open to the
challenge of philosophy (Soffer 1994: 173).
CONFRONTING SPINOZA AND THE ‘THEOLOGICO-POLITICAL PREDICAMENT’
With this much of the mature Strauss’ position established, we can begin to see why Spinoza
must assume such decisive importance for him, throughout Strauss’ career. On the one hand, as
Spinoza’s embrace by liberal German Jews in the nineteenth century attests (Smith 2006: 75),
Spinoza is the first philosopher to defend a form of political liberalism, predicated on the freedom
of conscience, if not of action (cf. (eg) Scruton 1986: 6–99), as the best political regime. To quote
Strauss:
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The new society, constituted by the aspiration common to all its members to-
wards the True, the Good, and the Beautiful, emancipated Jews in Germany.
Spinoza became the symbol of that emancipation which was to be not only
emancipation but secular redemption [see anon]. In Spinoza, a thinker and a
saint who was both a Jew and a Christian and hence neither, all cultured fam-
ilies of the earth, it was hoped, would be blessed (Smith 2006: 76).
As this implies, Spinoza is also a figure who, at the heart of the enlightenment, did in his way
try to ‘synthesise’ philosophy and revelation. He did this by submitting the claims of the latter
to the principles or court of the former in his Tractatus Theologico-Politicus. According to
Strauss, to quote from the important ‘Preface’ to his 1935 text, Philosophy and Law:
If … the basis of the Jewish tradition is belief in the creation of the world, in
the reality of biblical miracles, in the absolute obligation and the essential im-
mutability of the Law as based on the revelation at Sinai, then one must say
that the Enlightenment has undermined the foundation of the Jewish tradition.
The radical enlightenment, Spinoza comes to mind, did just this from the begin-
ning, with full consciousness and full intent (Strauss 1935: 5 [italics mine]).
Spinoza in these ways indeed becomes the figure whose legacy Strauss has to overcome in order
to launch own ‘theologico-political’ project, as both a philosopher and a Jewish thinker. As
Heinrich Meier has argued in his most recent book, indeed, Strauss’ 1962 autobiographical
‘Preface’ to Spinoza’s Critique of Revelation certainly encourages the hypothesis that all of
Strauss’ work can be read as a kind of repetition and undoing of Spinoza’s Theologico-Political
treatise, and the like treatises of Hobbes and the other great, modern enlighteners. (Meier 2006,
3, 9-18) What then does Strauss say concerning Spinoza in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion and
elsewhere? And – which will be my more specific question, because one which we will see is also
inescapably (at) the basis of Strauss’ own response to Spinoza – che vuoi?, that is: what is it that
Strauss wants, or which ‘powerful prejudice’ might he want us to want, by way of his reading[s]
of Spinoza? (Strauss 1935: 4).
Strauss’ proximate interlocutor in Spinoza’s Critique of Spinoza is his teacher, the Marburg
neo-Kantian Hermann Cohen, author of Religion of Reason Out of the Sources of Judaism. In
‘Spinoza Uber Staat Und Religion …’ [1915, 1924] Cohen had argued that Spinoza’s very title
in his Theologico-Political Treatise already indicates the former’s elision of the one theoretical
element, namely philosophy, which might mediate between Spinoza’s theological concerns, and
the book’s defense of political liberalism. In the absence of ‘the link of philosophy’ (Strauss 1924:
141), Cohen contended that Spinoza’s critiques of Judaism and of Maimonides in the Treatise
could only have been motivated by a theoretically groundless, ‘humanly incomprehensible’ hatred
of his own people, if not the all-too-human desire to exact vengeance on the Jewish people for
his ban of 1670. Already in Strauss’ 1924 response, ‘Cohen’s Analysis of Spinoza’s Bible Science’,
by contrast, the broad parameters of Strauss’ career-long, politico-philosophical, hermeneutic
are evident. Strauss does not begin, a la Cohen, in purely theoretical concerns, and then descend
to an historical or psychological ‘conjecture’ about Spinoza’s motives (Strauss 1924: 143). Strauss
argues that the connection between political theory and critique of the bible is ‘sufficiently mo-
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tivated’ by ascending from Spinoza’s historical or political context, ‘whether or not he was full
of hatred towards Judaism’ (Strauss 1924: 143, 147). In particular, Strauss points out, Spinoza
shared with Maimonides (and we may add, lastingly, with one Leo Strauss) at least this much:
the existential conviction that the philosophical way of life or bios, characterised by freedom of
inquiry, was the highest form of life for ‘the few’, if not for ‘the many’ (Strauss 1924: 142). In
the political circumstances of seventeenth century Netherlands, Strauss writes:
The combination of the two heterogeneous problems of [Spinoza’s] treatise has
a deep root, namely, the context from which the separation of the two powers
[of the day, State and Church] arises. That is to say: with respect to the state –
and since the reference was to a liberal government – the rational construction
[of the text] would have sufficed. The claims of the church, however, rested
less on reason than on scripture. Therefore it was not enough to prove [in the
Tractatus] that reason does not acknowledge the tutelage of the Church, it also
had to be shown that the Church could not rely on Scripture … [as] an authority
for restricting free inquiry (Strauss 1924: 142).
Strauss makes clear that, by putting the comprehension of Spinoza’s ‘theologico-political’ reflec-
tions on their proper footing – as a political defense of philosophy – he intends his critique of
Spinoza to be much more radical than that of Cohen, his teacher (Strauss 1924: 158–161, 173).
Indeed, Strauss’ 1932 ‘Testament of Spinoza’ finally proposes that the Jewish people should or
must, imperatively, as it were ‘repeat’ Spinoza’s 1670 excommunication, although the philosopher
in him is unable not to conclude by acknowledging that Spinoza will continue to be venerated
‘as long as there are men who know what it means to utter [the word] independence’ (Strauss
1932: 222).4
STRAUSS’ CRITIQUE OF SPINOZA’S CRITIQUE OF RELIGION
Strauss’ Spinoza’s Critique of Religion begins by aligning Spinoza’s treatise with the tradition of
the materialist critique of religion beginning with Epicurus in antiquity. This tradition was re-
kindled, and given a specifically political spin, in the ‘great age of enlightenment’ by Da Costa,
Peyrere, and Hobbes, against the background of the need to overcome the religious conflict that
divided Europe (Strauss 1962: 35–106; 1926: 187–196). For all the marked differences between
Spinoza’s position and those of his predecessors in the materialist tradition, Spinoza shares two
tasks with them, Strauss observes: first (1), the critique of the contents of religious belief, as
teachings laying claim to the truth; second (2), the critique of what Strauss calls the ‘interest’ in
the contents of such religious beliefs (Strauss 1926: 182). It inescapably falls to the radical critic
of religion in the first sense, Strauss notes, to explain how or why, if religious beliefs are untrue
and/or unverifiable, so many others could have fallen prey to, or felt the need for, such untrue
beliefs. It is fair to say that the final force or effect of Strauss’ critique of Spinoza’s critique of
revealed religion is to argue that its potency in the last instance rests, and can only rest, on
Spinoza’s rhetorical – which is to say sub-philosophical – discrediting of the motives for religious
belief, as we shall see. The logic of the way Strauss goes about trying to establish this can be
signaled by means of a liberal paraphrase of the first of Benjamin’s Theses on the Philosophy of
History:
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The puppet called ‘Orthodoxy’ is to win all the time. It can easily be a match
for anyone if it enlists the services of the inscrutability of the will or ways of
God, which at least until comparatively recently had been wizened by the ridicule
of the enlightenment and had to keep out of sight.5
The heart of Strauss’ Spinozabuch has three parts. These examine Spinoza’s critique of Orthodoxy
or of scripture (1962: 111–146); Spinoza’s critique of Maimonides as the highest culmination
of Jewish ‘theology’ (147–192); and Spinoza’s critique of the Calvinist anti-philosophy prominent
in the Netherlands of his day (193–214).
Spinoza’s avowed aim in the Theologico-Political Treatise was ‘to liberate men’s minds, held
fast in … prejudice, so that they might philosophise freely’ (Strauss 1962: 144, 111–113). It is
this abidingly political aim, Strauss proposes, that allows us to explain the structure of the text’s
theological and philosophical contents. In the Tractatus, Spinoza could not presuppose ‘the
constitution of philosophy’, or the teachings of his own metaphysics in the Ethics (Strauss 1962:
144). Just as Hegel’s Phenomenology or the Platonic dialogues differently start with the pre-
philosophic doxa of contemporaries, so Spinoza had to begin by the ‘immanent’ (or even broadly
‘proto-deconstructive’) critique of the dogmatic teachings of accepted scripture. By donning the
cap of Orthodoxy, and posing the scriptures ‘as throughout and in every respect divine’ (Strauss
1962: 115), though, Spinoza’s goal was to ‘limit the authority of Scripture in its own realm,’ and
in this way to persuade those who had the ears to hear to cast aside the talit altogether (Strauss
1962: 114). Spinoza attempted this, first, by showing how scripture itself contains contradictory
statements on ‘all the theological tenets over which philosophy and religion are in conflict’.6 The
implication would be that, on all such matters, there is space within the bounds of received religion
for philosophical reason to assume interpretive authority (Strauss 1962: 120, 138–139). Secondly
and centrally, Spinoza adopted the accepted theological doctrines of the identity of the will and
intellect of God, and of His omnipotence, in order to try to reduce to absurdity orthodox beliefs
about the activity, revelation and sovereign decrees of God (Strauss 1962: 147–156; Soffer 1994:
148–151). For Spinoza, as many readers will know, to talk of God’s will or decree as if this might
be something different from the laws timelessly comprehended in the Divine ‘Intellect’, is both
to diminish the latter, and to submit to a false conception of God sub specie durationis (cf.
Scruton 1986: 93–96). From these ‘pious’ considerations, though, Spinoza purports to show that
deeply impious consequences follow: that both exceptional revelation to inspired prophets (Strauss
1962: 183–185) and miraculous events in general are impossible. The reason is that both these
possibilities would presuppose that God’s transcendent will was capable of interrupting the laws
of His own creation (Strauss 1962: 123–136, 185–191; Soffer 1994: 145–155). Equally foreclosed,
more deeply than this, is the prophets’ founding conception of divine law. The hallakah, Spinoza
notes, is ordinarily understood as a set of proscriptions which humans might freely violate. Yet
such human freedom to act in ways (ex hypothesi) unforeseeable by the Divine Mind again implies
the impious conclusion that this Mind cannot be omniscient, or at least not equivalent to God’s
will (Strauss 1962: 154–155).
Readers familiar with the Cartesian argument for the Infinity of God in Descartes’ Meditation
III will recall how the argument effectively devolves upon the rigid designation of God as in the
first instance that which the cogito can say absolutely nothing determinate (or ‘finite’) about,
beyond affirming: ‘Of God: That He Exists’ (Sharpe 2006c). Strauss’ critique of Spinoza’s critique
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of religion ironically recalls the method, if not the content, of Descartes’ meditation. At each
point Spinoza believes he has been able to find enough common ground between philosophy and
revelation to allow the former to meaningfully engage with the latter, Strauss draws the ground
from beneath Spinoza’s feet (cf. Strauss 1989: 305–309). Spinoza’s critique of the inconsistency
of the bible presupposes for its effect acceptance of the one axiomatic proposition which ‘sums
up all the presuppositions of Spinoza’s bible science’: ‘the Bible is a Human book’ (Strauss 1962:
258; 143, 144–146). Yet, argues Strauss, it is exactly this proposition that the believer as believer
will deny. Spinoza’s ‘positive’ critique of miracles, which purports to show the unknowability
of (imputed) miracles on the basis of all human knowledge acquired hitherto can, as such (Strauss
1962: 123–136), at most show the improbability of miraculous suspensions of natural law.
Again, though, the improbability of God’s miraculous action approaches an adequate description
of their specifically miraculous nature for believers (Strauss 1962: 135–136). The appearance of
piety informing Spinoza’s denial of the difference between the will and intellect of God, Strauss
notes most decisively of all, conceals Spinoza’s impious presumption to be able to speak mean-
ingfully at all about the Divine (Strauss 1962: 152–153). Maimonides’ alleged conception of this
‘identity’, by contrast, was instead an expression of his avowed inability to predicate concerning
God (Strauss 1962: 152). The latter’s defense of the possibilities of prophecy, miracles and lex
divina, in turn, were predicated – contra Spinoza – on the wholly consistent prioritization of the
spontaneous will of God over what we take to be his Divine Mind. The reason is that to speak
of the Divine Will, or so contends Strauss, is ‘… the surpassing means of adumbrating [exactly]
the incomprehensibility of God’ (Strauss 1962: 154 (italics mine); 1989: 307).
‘RIDICULE’? YOUNG STRAUSS’ JACOBIAN (AB)GRUND FOR THE CRITIQUE OF
MODERN ENLIGHTENMENT
What then can we say concerning the results of Strauss’ critique in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion?
Figures including Smith and Zank have noted that the mediate interlocutor of Strauss’ 1930
book, beyond Hermann Cohen, was F. H. Jacobi, on whom Strauss had written his dissertation
(under Ernst Cassirer) in 1921 (Smith 2006: 67–71; Zank 2002, 15–26, 34–35). In the famous
German ‘pantheism’ debate (with Mendelssohn) in the 1780s, Jacobi had argued that Spinoza’s
rationalist system of ethics denied the possibility of free human will, and hence the possibility of
morality (Smith 2006: 69–71). Strauss’ move in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion is to effectively
‘bid up’ Jacobi’s radical opposition between reason and/or ‘nihilism’, and ‘faith’ and/or morality.
The argued failure of Spinoza’s immanent critique of scripture and theology means for Strauss
that, in the last instance, Spinoza’s critique of religion must rest on the demonstrable sufficiency
of reason, and so Spinoza’s system in the Ethics, to demonstrate the philosophic comprehensib-
ility of God (Strauss 1989: 307). Yet, as Strauss was to argue fully only after his kehre in the
early 1930s (in Persecution and the Art of Writing (Soffer 1994: 165–167), ‘Progress or Return?’
(Strauss 1989: 307–309) and elsewhere) Strauss maintains that a careful reading of Spinoza’s
Ethics in the light of Spinoza’s Correspondences shows that the opening definitions of this text
are ‘arbitrary’, ‘and since the definitions are arbitrary, so are the conclusions’ (Strauss 1994:
308). In Spinoza’s letters to Meyer, Strauss observes, Spinoza argued for the final priority of
analytic philosophical method, as ‘the method by which truth is discovered’ on the basis of per-
ceived phenomena, over synthesis, as that method ‘by which it [analytic truth] is set in order
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(Soffer 1994: 165–166). If this is so, argues Strauss, then the groundlessness of the initial axioms
of the synthetic system of the Ethics must follow:
They are not evident in themselves but they are thought to become evident
through their alleged result: they and only they are thought to make possible
the clear and distinct account of everything; [and] in the light of the clear and
distinct account, the Biblical account appears to be confused. The Ethics [thus]
begs the decisive question, the question as to whether the clear and distinct ac-
count is as such true, and not merely a plausible hypothesis (Strauss 1962: 29).
Jacobi accepted, in fear and trembling, that Spinoza’s rational account of the whole might be
true and comprehensive in order to advocate the possibility of an ‘arbitrary’ decision against it.
We see now that, by contrast, Strauss goes one step further. Spinozism itself, Strauss argues, far
from establishing universal determinism on grounds of reason alone, itself rests on a necessary
act of ‘arbitrary’ or existential choice (cf. Smith 2006: 80–81). Such a choice might be more or
less ‘plausible,’ but this cannot obscure the fact that the adjudication of its ‘plausibility’ can only
take place after one has opted for reason, and within reason’s terms. The non-availability of
knowledge of the whole, as we might put it, means that if one opts for philosophy, one exactly
opts for it, and so might equally have wagered otherwise. As Strauss’ 1962 ‘Preface’ to Spinoza’s
Critique of Religion is still able to affirm, reflecting upon the results of his pivotal early encounter
with Spinoza:
The genuine refutation of orthodoxy would require the proof that the world
and human life are perfectly intelligible without the assumption of a mysterious
God. … Spinoza’s Ethics attempts to be that system but it does not succeed;
the clear and distinct account of everything which it presents remains funda-
mentally hypothetical. As a consequence its cognitive status is not different
from that of the orthodox account. Certain it is that Spinoza cannot deny the
possibility of revelation. But to grant that revelation is possible means to grant
that the philosophic account and the philosophic way of life are not necessarily,
nor evidently, the true account of everything: philosophy, the quest for evident
and necessary knowledge, rests itself on an unevident decision, on an act of
will, just as faith does (Strauss 1962: 29 [italics mine]; 1989: 304–305,
309–310).
So what then does Strauss take himself to have disclosed, by way of his theological-philosophical
engagement with Spinoza? And: what should we say concerning what Strauss’ critique of Spinoza
might say of or to us today?
Strauss’ 1962 ‘Preface’ explains that his 1925–1928 study of Spinoza had been ‘based on the
premise, sanctioned by powerful prejudice, that a return to pre-modern philosophy is impossible’
(Strauss 1962: 31). If this premise had animated Strauss’ early reading of Spinoza, it is certain
that Strauss’ argument in Spinoza’s Critique of Religion served to convince him that, at the very
least, the modern enlightenment had not succeeded in refuting revelation on the basis of reason
alone. To ironically adopt what Strauss was to say concerning Spinoza, Strauss rather took
himself to have overcome the modern enlightenment radically by understanding it radically
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(Strauss 1962: 30). At the root even of Spinoza’s attempt to refute Orthodoxy was allegedly an
unevident decision, ‘just as in faith’, Strauss argues. In other words, the deepest question we will
always be entitled to ask of a philosopher is che vuoi? (what do you want by choosing philo-
sophy?), rather than the already-philosophical question why do you hold to some one or other
opinions, beliefs, etc.? ‘[T]he antagonism between Spinoza and Judaism, between belief and non-
belief, is ultimately not theoretical, but moral’, Strauss can thus claim in his later ‘Preface’ to
Spinoza’s Critique of Religion (Strauss 1962: 29; 1989: 297–298).
In the same way, Strauss came to argue, the great enlighteners can only have been motivated
by an ethical or existential choice against what they perceived to the ‘kingdom of darkness’ of
religious societies, not the pure insight they valorised and advertised (Strauss 1962: 28–29,
178–182; 1936/1976, esp. viii–xii, 1–5, 29). In the same way, despite Strauss’ own cautioning
of Cohen against psychologizing Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Tractatus, he argues that the
success of this historical opposition to revelation can ultimately have rested less on reason than
on rhetoric and ‘ridicule’:
From this point of view, it is easy to understand how mockery played so great
a role in critique of religion in the Age of Enlightenment. The Enlightenment,
as Lessing put it, had to laugh orthodoxy out of a position from which it could
not be driven by any other means …/ The critique has a prospect of success,
not by direct argumentation, but only by virtue of the mockery that lends spice
to the arguments, and lodges them firmly in the hearer’s mind … (Strauss 1962:
143, 145–146).
CRITIQUE AND CONSEQUENCES: COMMENTS AGAINST SEVERAL ACCEPTED
(ANTI-)STRAUSSIAN DOXAI
In the contemporary conjuncture, when debates concerning Strauss have become so Manichean
or polemical, what consequences or conclusions can we glean from undertaking a study of his
earliest book on Spinoza?
A first striking, and perhaps surprising, consequence of a close study of Strauss’ writings of
Spinoza, is to immediately reverse the widespread suspicion of Strauss as ‘esoterically’ a Nietz-
schean relativist posing nobly to the non-philosophical public as a classical rationalist or orthodox
theologian (eg Drury 1988). Such a position underlies much of the contemporary animus towards
Strauss’ work. Yet here as elsewhere, I would argue that les non-dupes errant (Sharpe 2006a,
2006b). To be sure, there are the famous, deeply compelling arguments Strauss puts against
historicism and decisionism concerning ultimate values in the opening chapters of Natural Right
and History. These would suggest Strauss’ exoteric, later or mature opposition to any position,
like that of his youthful writings, which would draw our attention to the groundless or abyssal
basis of arguments concerning the whole and the good. Yet, as Strauss’ defense of the conclusions
of Spinoza’s Critique of Religion in his late ‘Preface’ indicates, the whole truth concerning Strauss’
position is more complex. As Catherine Zuckert has noted, it remains that when Strauss spoke
publicly on political questions, and in particular – as in his famous address ‘Why We Remain
Jews?’ (Strauss 1994) – when Strauss spoke concerning the political prospects of his own, partic-
ular people, that Strauss always defended the fundamental ‘differend’ between reason and revel-
ation.7 Again and again in these texts, like a good Nietzschean, Strauss openly highlights the
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‘conflict’, ‘antagonism’, ‘fundamental tension’ at the basis of the West as what above all the
modern age has failed to accommodate, or by ‘dialectically’ accommodating it, has denatured:
The recognition of two conflicting roots of Western civilization is, at first, a
very disconcerting observation. Yet this realization has also something assuring
and comforting about it. The very life of Western civilization is the life between
two codes, a fundamental tension. There is, therefore, no reason inherent in
Western civilization itself, in its fundamental constitution, why it should give
life. But this comforting thought is justified only if we live that life, if we live
that conflict. Living the conflict may not be the ideal situation for human beings,
but we must be prudent and accept our fate, with the realization that ‘it is not
the worst fate which men could imagine’ (Strauss 1989: 289–290, 298).
If we are to properly understand the nature of Strauss’ later kehre away from his earlier work,
then, we must note the continuity in Strauss’ emphasis on the inability of reason alone to decide
the question between reason and revelation between young and mature Strauss. The question is
of how this continuity can be understood, on the basis of Strauss’ texts. There are at least two
consequences of noting this continuity I want to highlight to conclude, in terms of contemporary
debates in political or critical theory.
The first point is that any progressive critiques of Strauss or ‘Straussianism’ that would pass
beyond the level of ridicule or mockery – thereby performatively confirming Strauss’ hyper-Jac-
obian critique of enlightenment – will first have to come to terms with the unheimlich proximity
between Strauss’ position and many of the leading positions hailed as politically of the left, if no
longer in the van of progress. Strauss’ Jacobian or Heideggerian position that the question che
vuoi? is ultimately deeper than all questions of why?, that all philosophical positions are hence
as ultimately groundless as the decision in favor of philosophy itself, and that one can only ask
after reasons after one has supra-rationally opted for reason against faith, etc., is after all not
only a position held by Leo Strauss and ‘Straussians’. Although in other contexts we would need
to specify between the letters of their texts, it is true to say that such a ‘pure insight’ is close to
central propositions in the later Derrida, Alain Badiou, or Slavoj Zizek, to invoke only three
proper names. For the later Derrida of The Gift of Death, for instance, every decision that is not
simply an exercise in reading off a conclusion from preexisting parameters allegedly must involve
what Derrida calls a decisionistic ‘madness,’ a groundless leap across an abyssal ‘undecidability’
(Derrida 1992: 26; 1995: 65, 77–80). For Zizek, despite his many polemics against post-struc-
turalism, the decisive Act to which his political work pushes us would create, ex nihilo, the very
grounds in whose light it would take on sense, on the model of traversing the fundamental fantasy
at the end of the psychoanalytic cure (Zizek 1993: ch. 2; 1999: ch. 1; 2002: ch. 5). For Badiou,
again, the ‘Truth Event’ – which is more like the messianic redemption envisioned in the bible
than the Marxian revolution it seeks to displace (cf. Scholem 1971: esp. 10) – can in no way be
espied in advance. Individuals’ ‘fidelity’ to it must be groundless, and involve ‘forcing’ others to
recognise its transformative subjective Truth after it has occurred, on the model of Saint Paul’s
missionary proclamation of the (for Badiou) fictitious resurrection of Christ (Badiou 2003: 2–17,
77–95).
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The second thing then that Strauss’ public defense of such a decisionistic position concerning
philosophical and ethical grounds shows us – although Carl Schmitt’s name might have been
sufficient – is that it is a falsified prejudice that decisionism based on non-availability of knowledge
of the whole is necessarily politically progressive, or politically of the ‘left’ in any other way. The
logic behind this widespread prejudice again exactly doubles that underlying Strauss’ critique of
Spinoza’s Theologico-Political Treaise. Strauss points to the argued impossibility of the modern
enlighteners to ground their own rational systems as a means of questioning the ‘powerful preju-
dice’ in favor of philosophical and historical modernity. Equally, the post-structuralist critiques
which uncover the abyssal undecidability (and hence need for one – or the Other – to have decided)
at the bases of dominant Western philosophemes (Derrida), metanarratives (Lyotard), law
(Agamben, later Derrida) or symbolic orders (Zizek) aim to show thereby the possibility of
challenging these dominant structures. Yet, here where the post-structuralist positions halt, I
would argue that the difference of Strauss’ neoconservative position, and the precise nature of
his later kehre, can be precisely stated.
Strauss himself comments in his 1962 ‘Preface’ to Spinoza’s Critique of Religion that ‘other
observations and experiences confirmed the suspicion that it would be unwise to say farewell to
reason,’ as he implicitly acknowledges this early analysis might have done (Strauss 1962: 31).
We can see one measure of what Strauss means by this by reflecting that, in this 1930 book on
Spinoza, the pre-destinarian Protestant John Calvin is the figure who emerges most clearly as-
cendant, untouched by the barbs of Spinoza’s rationalism because of his fundamental or funda-
mentalist Pauline choice against rationalism[s] as such (Strauss 1962: 193–214). As Heinrich
Meier notes, Strauss’ description of faith as grounded in the will certainly describes the position
of a pre-modern believer much less adequately than the religion of the contemporary ‘man from
Missouri’, as Strauss once described the American everyman from the Bible belt (Meier 2006:
16). What emerges from Strauss’ 1932 ‘Comments’ on Schmitt’s Concept of the Political that
Strauss says marked the first expression of his ‘change of orientation’ – and so come to append
the 1962 version of Spinoza’s Critique of Religion – is that young Strauss’ critique of reason in
order to make room for faith in no way returned him to the orbit of the German idealism of his
teachers. Rather, what emerged at this point of Strauss’ trajectory was his own take on the ad-
monition of ‘caute’ [cautiously] of Spinoza’s signet ring, which Strauss praises at the end of his
other 1932 essay, ‘The Testament of Spinoza’. Namely, Strauss came now to accept the pre-
modern distinctions between philosophy and politics, the many and the few, and with it the twin
justifications of guarded, esoteric writing analyzed later in Persecution and the Art of Writing.
On the one side, Strauss could never renounce his own philosophic path, and so the desire to
protect and promote the fearless freedom of inquiry dear to Spinoza (and Nietzsche and all the
other philosophers). On the other side, as the 1932 ‘Comments’ on Schmitt make clear, the mature
Strauss’ distance from Spinoza’s modern ‘theologico-political’ synthesis is played out on the basis
of Strauss’ accepting, in a way that pushes him beyond the horizon of modern liberalism, the
need to ‘take evil seriously’ (Shell 1994: 175). If philosophy can not disprove revelation, for the
mature Strauss, it also has a public duty not to undermine its bases. The reason is that revealed
religion is both salutary for non-philosophers, and necessary for the political order which would
make philosophy possible, given the overwhelming historical and existential reality of what
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Strauss calls, with and against Schmitt, ‘evil as moral depravity’ (Strauss 1962: 345; Shell 1994:
189).8
It goes without saying that it is with this political turn that the convergence between Strauss’
neo-conservatism and post-structuralism ends, exactly where Strauss’ solution to his own ‘theo-
logico-political predicament,’ and his specifically political philosophy, began.
ENDNOTES
1
See Muravchik (2004: 249): ‘there is however one thing Strauss and Trotsky did have in common,
and one thing that may get us closer to the real reason their names have been so readily invoked. Both
were Jews. The neoconservatives, it turns out, are also in large part Jewish – and this, to their detract-
ors, constitutes evidence of the ulterior motives that lurk behind the policies they oppose.’
2
This paper was originally presented at a conference on Spinoza at the Victorian College of the Arts
in Melbourne in September 2006.
3
As I have done elsewhere. See Sharpe 2006a and Sharpe 2006b.
4
Leo Strauss, ‘Testament of Spinoza’ (1932) ends, in full, as follows: ‘And still we ask whether we owe
him veneration? Spinoza will be venerated as long as there are men who know how to appreciate the
inscription on his signet ring (‘caute’ [cautiously, safely]) or, to put it plainly, as long as there are men
who know what it means to utter [the word] independence’ (in Leo Strauss 1932/2002). And see below.
5
To underscore: the substitution of ‘Orthodoxy’ for ‘historical materialism’ in Benjamin, and of ‘the
inscrutability of the will or ways of God’ for ‘theology’ in Benjamin, aims principally just to highlight
the logic of Strauss’ argument. We cannot pursue here the question, nor do we mean to robustly
suggest, the parallels between Strauss’ and Benjamin’s positions as young German Jews in Weimar.
This logic at stake in Strauss’ critique of the ability of Spinoza’s critique of the bible to touch upon
what is at stake in religious faith is made clear in ensuing paragraphs.
6
And, per absurdum, the contents of the various ‘revealed’ religions contradict each other.
7
Again, the first two parts of ‘Progress or Return?’ were adapted from a speech Strauss gave in
November 1952 to Hillel House at the University of Chicago. These two parts are where Strauss
highlights the ‘two roots of Western civilization’, and the vitality of their tension.
8
As Shell shows, the meaning of Strauss’ enigmatic closing remarks to his ‘Comments on Der Begriff
der Politschen’ – that Schmitt needs to more radically overcome liberalism – is this. Schmitt acknow-
ledges the ‘authoritarian’ conviction that man is evil and in need of domension. However, as his re-
course to Hobbes would indicate, Schmitt figures this ‘evil’ in terms of man’s being the cunning and
dangerous animal of the liberal state of nature: namely, as fundamentally ‘guiltless’ (as of course
Spinoza also did). What Strauss proposes, that is, if Schmitt is to overcome the ‘systematics’ of liberal
thought, is for him to ‘work his way back to the conception of evil as moral depravity (Schlechtigkeit).’
(Strauss 1962: 345).
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